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The Epistemological
Egg, or the
Metaphysical
Chicken?
by Amanda Bartley

In Plato’s Meno, Meno
asks Socrates if virtue can be
taught. Socrates responds that to
know if virtue can be taught or
not, one must first know what
virtue is. Meno responds, “He
cannot search for what he knows
– since he knows it, there is no
need to search – nor for what he
does not know, for he does not
know what to look for.” Meno's
question is one of epistemology.
Epistemology is the theory of
knowledge: what knowledge is,
how we get it, what we can or
cannot know, or if we really have
knowledge to begin with. In
Meno’s case, it is the question of
how we are able to transmit the
knowledge of virtue from one
person to another. Socrates
realizes that Meno’s very
question makes a significant
assumption: that he knows what
virtue is in the first place. This is
a question of metaphysics.
Metaphysics studies the
nature and principles of being, or
reality. When he engages in
metaphysics, Socrates engages in
the study of “what is”. He insists
that one must know virtue in the
metaphysical sense before one
can ask any questions about it.
The metaphysical and

epistemological questions posed
by Meno and Socrates tend to
blend together, partly due to the
fact that neither of these
categories – epistemology and
metaphysics – has been created
at this point. This blending is also
due to the fact that every
metaphysical question tends to
have epistemological assumptions
hidden in it and vice versa.
To Socrates (and by
extension Plato), the first
question to be asked is that of
metaphysics, “What is virtue?”
The epistemological aspect does
not arise: that we have the
capability to know and
understand virtue is self- evident
to Socrates. Today this is not so.
Descartes’ Discourse on the
Method started what today we
call the “epistemological turn” in
philosophy. Since Descartes, the
primary questions of philosophy
have been epistemological in
nature, not metaphysical, as they
had been in the past, for the
Discourse focuses not on what we
know, but how we know. It is
thus a forerunner of the scientific
method. Science itself, though it
seeks to tell us about reality and
its laws, is an epistemological
discipline. That is, science first
affirms that the scientific method
is how we know, so that it can
then tell us what we know.
But is the Cartesianscientific approach correct?
Should we start with
epistemology, or should we
oppose this method and begin
with metaphysics? If we start

with epistemology we may arrive
at the conclusion of what we may
or may not know, but is this the
pursuit of truth or the pursuit of
something else? By restricting
our range of knowledge we may
cut out the possibility of knowing
ultimate truth. If we are
incapable of knowing ultimate
truth, it is pointless to continue to
search for it regardless if it exists
or not. Thus the only truths we
can come to know are the little
truths that we are capable of, the
“truths” of a given epistemology.
If, however, we start with the
metaphysical question, then by
not knowing what we are capable
or incapable of knowing we may
be pursuing an unattainable goal.
From the pragmatic (and also
today’s commonsense
“scientific”) view the obvious
choice would be to choose
epistemology. At least then, most
people would say, we would know
something, even if it is the
negative knowledge of what we
can’t know. Perhaps, but by
pursuing this course we have
done so at the expense of any
philosophy in the true Socratic
sense. Seems as though Meno has
won after all.
When searching for
knowledge about reality, should
we first ask the epistemological
question of knowledge, or the
metaphysical question about
“being in general?” We will
discuss this question at our next
meeting. The question should be
particularly interesting for those
with an inclination towards
science, as science is the dominate

force in modern times that
investigates reality. Should
science re-think its starting point,
or is it even possible for it to do
so? Finally, what truths do we get
from such observations of
reality? Does science give us
“ultimate truth”, or the little
truths of its particular discipline?
Please join the PDG on
Monday, February 17, at 7:00
p.m. for our profound reflections
on this metaphysicoepistemologico-presuppositional
discussion. We will meet in the
Honor's Lounge on the second
floor of Gamble Hall.

A Polemical
Addendum
by Ernst Virklick

Instead of permitting me
to write the lead article, which is
what he should have done, Eric
informed me a week ago that
Amanda Bartley was writing an
essay for the acclaimed
Philosopher’s Stone on a topic
dear to my heart, or at least on a
topic near to the topic dear to my
heart. I believe – as I have not
yet seen her article – that Bartley
is writing on whether
epistemology should precede
ontology, or whether ontology
should precede epistemology in
philosophical inquiry. I would
like, however, to write about the
half-witted haughtiness of
scientists who think that science
is purely epistemological, or, to
bring my polemic closer to
Bartley’s topic, on the
thoughtlessness of those who
maintain that science does not
involve an ontological
perspective, and thus begins with
epistemology.

I was recently at a
conference in which an
overconfident scientist argued for
the epistemological purity of
science, that is, that science
attempts only to provide an
epistemological method for
looking at and manipulating the
world and, therefore, assumes no
ontology, which he proceeded to
condemn as “a blind groping in
the dark.” Aside from his
assertion about the absence of
ontology in science and his
startlingly unoriginal metaphor,
this analytical monster had
nothing to say about ontology.
His assertion, however, reveals
his base foolishness, a trait of
which many scientists partake.
For science – this
epistemological discipline –
assumes an ontological
perspective without which
science and the scientific method
fail to have meaning. The
scientific method is based on the
repeatability of experiments. It
proves the “reality” of gravity by
the repetition of experiments that
confirm past experiments: so
long as the ball drops down to the
ground instead of soaring into
the air, gravity is assumed to be
actual. But is it not evident to
scientists that this method of
proof assumes an ontological
belief, namely that the future will
be like the past, that nature is
uniform? The scientific belief
that generalizations about the
future can be made on the basis
of past experiments presupposes
that reality is uniform, or
regular, and this presupposition,
without which science could not
logically function, though it
could, and does, illogically
function – this presupposition is
ontological in character.
Moreover, scientific fops
also fail to notice that scientific
procedure involves the

conjunction of observation and
mathematics. That is, the
scientist compiles a table of data,
then looks for a pattern in her
data that she can represent by
means of a formula. The
problem with this procedure is
that it relies on mathematics,
which by nature deals with static
entities, to describe a dynamic
world. Thus, in order for
scientific procedure to work
logically, the scientist must
assume that reality is not a
continuous flow or process, but a
succession of physical or
energical events, or that reality is
a succession of fragmented
moments in time. I have not the
fragments of time, or space, to
point out the problem to which
this perspective on reality entails;
my task is gently to remind
scientists that this perspective on
reality is an ontology, that science
is not epistemologically pure.

If you have any questions,
criticisms, or comments,
please contact either Eric
Verhine or Dr. Nordenhaug.
Anyone interested in
writing a brief article for
The Philosopher’s Stone,
please contact either of us.
Eric Verhine, Editor of
Philosopher’s Stone
everhine@yahoo.com
Dr. Erik Nordenhaug,
Faculty Advisor
nordener@mail.armstrong.e
du

